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Abstract—Edge computing servers like cloudlets from different
service providers that compensate scarce computational, memory,
and energy resources of mobile devices, are distributed across
access networks. However, depending on the mobility pattern and
dynamically varying computational requirements of associated
mobile devices, cloudlets at different parts of the network
become either overloaded or under-loaded. Hence, load balancing
among neighboring cloudlets appears to be an essential research
problem. Nonetheless, the existing load balancing frameworks are
unsuitable for low-latency applications. Thus, in this paper, we
propose an economic and non-cooperative load balancing game
for low-latency applications among neighboring cloudlets, from
same as well as different service providers. Firstly, we propose
a centralized incentive mechanism to compute the unique Nash
equilibrium load balancing strategies of the cloudlets under the
supervision of a neutral mediator. With this mechanism, we
ensure that the truthful revelation of private information to the
mediator is a weakly-dominant strategy for both the under-loaded
and overloaded cloudlets. Secondly, we propose a continuous-
action reinforcement learning automata-based algorithm, which
allows each cloudlet to independently compute the Nash equilib-
rium in a completely distributed network setting. We critically
study the convergence properties of the designed learning al-
gorithm, scaffolding our understanding of the underlying load
balancing game for faster convergence. Furthermore, through
extensive simulations, we study the impacts of exploration and
exploitation on learning accuracy. This is the first study to show
the effectiveness of reinforcement learning algorithms for load
balancing games among neighboring cloudlets.
Index Terms—Cloudlets, non-cooperative game theory, incen-
tive mechanism design, reinforcement learning automata.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE next-generation Internet is not only expected toroute data, but also to store and process data, generated
from a large number of pervasive mobile devices like smart-
phones, tablets, and Internet-of-Thing devices. In state-of-
the-art cloud-computing networks, mobile devices can offload
data to remote cloud servers for storage and processing to
compensate for their computation, memory, and energy re-
source poverty [1]. With the recent emergence of ultra-reliable
and low-latency communication (uRLLC) applications such as
virtual/augmented reality, automotive, and teleoperation as part
of the Tactile Internet paradigm [2], the long communication-
latency between mobile devices and remote cloud server
appears to be a major bottleneck to satisfy the low-latency
requirements of 10-100 ms [3]. To overcome this hurdle,
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researchers from both industry and academia proposed edge
computing solutions like multi-access edge computing, fog
computing, and cloudlet computing [4]. For sixth-generation
(6G) networks, edge computing nodes are also being used to
implement various artificial intelligence-based protocols, e.g.,
application layer prediction and network layer prediction, that
can facilitate various uRLLC applications across long-distance
networks. In application layer prediction, different application-
specific data is used and in network layer prediction, various
network parameter data are used for network load prediction
to reduce the decision making latency [5].
Note that edge computing servers like cloudlets are es-
sentially a computer or cluster of computers installed in the
proximity of mobile device users and distributed across access
networks [6]. Thus, the authors of [7]–[12] proposed effi-
cient cloudlet placement frameworks over wireless and fiber-
wireless access networks. As cloudlet computing systems are
essentially distributed computing systems, the authors of [13]–
[17] addresses the optimal job request allocation problem from
mobile devices to cloudlets while meeting computation and
communication constraints. Although job allocation frame-
works allocate job requests to the most favorable cloudlets, due
to the dynamic nature of job request arrival process, cloudlets
at different parts of a large network become overloaded and
under-loaded at different times. Thus, the authors of [18]–
[23] designed efficient load balancing frameworks among
neighboring cloudlets.
In this paper, we focus on the load balancing problem
among neighboring cloudlets. We critically observe in the
existing literature that most authors who addressed load bal-
ancing problems mainly stressed on minimizing the overall
latency of cloudlets. However, users are indifferent if the
cloudlets can process the incoming job requests within the
requested quality-of-service (QoS) latency, i.e., with a QoS
latency target of 10 ms, users do not differentiate among job
request processing times 4 ms, 8 ms, or 10 ms. Nonetheless,
failing to meet the QoS latency target should incur a significant
penalty on the cloudlets. With this realization, we propose a
novel game-theoretic utility function which is maximum when
the end-to-end latency is equal to the QoS latency target. In
turn, this objective function makes each cloudlet interested
in receiving some extra job requests from their neighboring
cloudlets and gain some economic benefit, whenever the
respective cloudlet is meeting the desired QoS latency target.
For load balancing among neighboring cloudlets from the
same service provider, network optimization based frameworks
proposed in [18]–[22] performs very efficiently. Nonetheless,
in a real heterogeneous deployment scenario, usually multi-
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2ple cloud service providers install cloudlets over the same
customer base and a game-theoretic framework is required
as different service providers are non-cooperative in general.
Thus, to capture this multi-party economic interaction among
heterogeneous neighboring cloudlets, our problem formulation
acts as an optimization problem among cloudlets from the
same service provider and acts like a non-cooperative game
among cloudlets from different service providers. Moreover,
as the existing load balancing frameworks make the load
balancing decisions after the actual job request arrival to
cloudlets, the overhead time of the load balancing algorithms
makes these frameworks highly unfit, especially for low-
latency applications. To deal with such scenarios, we make
the cloudlets predict the job request arrival rates and make
the load balancing decisions beforehand, so that immediate
processing after actual job request arrival is possible, which is
also in line with 6G network vision [5].
To compute the Nash equilibrium (NE) load balancing
strategies of the cloudlets, firstly we propose a centralized
framework where all the competing cloudlets send their pre-
dicted job request arrival rates to a mediator. The mediator
computes the NE load balancing strategies for the cloudlets
and broadcasts to them before the actual job request arrival. It
is important to note that competing cloudlets are not always
necessarily truthful while revealing private information e.g.,
total incoming job requests, and may adopt strategies to gain
some additional economic benefit from the market. Thus, we
propose a scheme where the neutral mediator is present in
the system to impose efficient incentive mechanisms such
that revelation of truthful information is ensured [24]. To the
best of our knowledge, none of the existing game-theoretic
frameworks on load balancing among cloudlets designed any
truthful mechanisms.
Secondly, we propose a distributed framework to compute
NE load balancing strategies among competing cloudlets,
which is independent of the truthfulness of cloudlets. Although
distributed frameworks are more robust than centralized frame-
works, all the cloudlets need to exchange extensive control
information among themselves [25]. This issue can be re-
solved by using various artificial intelligence-based schemes to
learn network conditions and make load balancing decisions.
However, the job request arrival process sometimes may vary
rapidly and for the sake of robustness against dynamic network
scenarios, where there is a very low correlation between the
trained data and real-time data, we avoid artificial neural
networks that heavily rely on historical data. Therefore, we
propose a reinforcement learning automata-based algorithm
such that quick convergence is ensured. This empowers the
cloudlets to make load balancing decisions independently,
without exchanging any control information among themselves
[26]. Neither of the incentive-compatible mechanism and
reinforcement learning automata-based algorithm was part of
the game-theoretic load balancing framework proposed in [27].
Our primary contributions in this paper are as follows:
(i) We formulate the load balancing problem among
cloudlets from the same as well as different service
providers as a novel economic and non-cooperative
game-theoretic problem. We prove the existence of NE
of this game formulation and show that each cloudlet is
able to maximize their respective utilities by participating
in the load balancing game.
(ii) We propose a centralized scheme for computation of NE
by a neutral mediator that supervises the load balancing
game among the cloudlets to ensure fairness in the
market competition. Hence, we design an efficient direct
revelation incentive compatible mechanism that ensures
that the truthful revelation of private information to the
mediator is always a weakly-dominant strategy for the
competing cloudlets.
(iii) We also design a distributed continuous-action rein-
forcement learning automata-based algorithm such that
neighboring cloudlets can independently compute the NE
load balancing strategy, without exchanging any control
information among themselves. We further scaffold the
learning algorithm with some particular characteristics
of the underlying load balancing game for faster conver-
gence. We critically study the impacts of exploration and
exploitation on the learning accuracy of the proposed NE
learning algorithm.
(iv) Finally, we show that any participating cloudlet can
achieve better utilities by mutual computation offloading
under different network load conditions following our
proposed NE strategies than any of the recent game-
theoretical load balancing models. In terms of average
end-to-end latency and utility values, the performance
of our proposed model is also better than those models,
particularly under highly overloaded conditions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II reviews some recent related works. In Section III, the
details of the system model are presented. In Section IV,
a non-cooperative game-theoretic problem among competing
cloudlets for computation offloading is formulated. In Section
V, a dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism is
designed. In Section VI, a distributed continuous-action re-
inforcement learning automata-based algorithm is proposed.
In Section VII, the proposed load balancing framework is
evaluated. Finally, in Section VIII, our primary achievements
by using the game-theoretic framework are summarized.
II. RELATED WORKS
Load balancing among edge computing nodes such as
cloudlets is a major research issue and some researchers
have recently proposed load balancing models based on opti-
mization and game-theoretical methods. The authors of [19]
compared the latency performance of three load balancing
systems through closed-form expressions, i.e., no sharing,
random sharing, and less loaded sharing with different de-
grees of cooperation between neighboring cloudlets. Primarily,
centralized and decentralized control structures are used in
existing literature to address load balancing problems [25].
A common objective function and a series of constraints are
formulated in centralized optimization method based models
to determine the optimal load balancing strategies for all
cloudlets. A centralized problem of latency minimization is
formulated by the authors of [18] and proposed a network-
flow based heuristic algorithm for solving it. These models
3can provide quick and efficient solutions to the problem, but
they are hard to implement on a realistic network situation
where cloudlets from various service providers coexist.
On the contrary, in decentralized control models, all dis-
tributed nodes exchange their local control information among
themselves and determine the load balancing strategies without
any central controller node. Although for large networks such
models are more robust, they cause inefficient sharing of con-
trol messages and computational burden on the network. Re-
cently, there is a growing interest in applying cooperative and
non-cooperative game-theoretical models to various network-
related issues, as game theory offers many effective tools
for evaluating and researching the relationship between dis-
tributed agents in conflict and cooperation [28]. Furthermore,
reinforcement learning algorithms also seem to be a valuable
approach to solving load balance problems but can present
different complexity and convergence issues in real-time [29].
A cooperative load balancing scheme was proposed by the
authors of [20] in which under-loaded cloudlets cooperate
with their neighbouring overloaded cloudlets to minimize their
blocking probability and processing latency.
We observed that two recent non-cooperative load bal-
ancing frameworks published in [21], [22] are close to our
present work. The authors of [21] proposed a distributed non-
cooperative load balancing game in small cell networks among
the neighboring cloudlets, and compared its findings with a
centralized load balancing system that leverage the Lyapunov-
drift technique to maximize the long-term system performance.
Each cloudlet tries to minimize end-to-end latency costs under
specific energy and latency constraints in this formulation.
This model, therefore, works very well if the network is loaded
moderately, but under very high load conditions it performs
very poorly because under very high load conditions, some
of the cloudlets start to violate the latency constraints and the
NE solution becomes infeasible. By identifying the estimated
latency as the dis-utility function of every cloudlet, the authors
of [22] devised a non-cooperative load balancing game where
cloudlets try to minimize its disutility and proposed an iterative
proximal algorithm to compute the NE solution. In this frame-
work, none of the cloudlets is allowed to offload until their
incoming job requests reach a certain threshold. Nonetheless,
this algorithm tends to assign a large number of job requests to
the under-loaded cloudlets and hence, the end-to-end latency
overshoots under very high load conditions.
To prevent the aforementioned issues, we tactfully integrate
the QoS latency target into our game design so that the
game does not become infeasible under any circumstances,
even under very high load condition. Although the overloaded
cloudlets can not offload their entire extra loads to their
under-loaded neighbors, our game formulation allows them to
offload job requests to the maximum extent. In such cases, the
overloaded cloudlets fail to meet the QoS latency target, but
their penalties are minimized to some extent. Moreover, the
under-loaded cloudlets will still meet the QoS latency target,
and hence, all the cloudlets will be able to maximize their
individual utilities. The utility of each cloudlet consists of the
revenue earned from all the incoming job requests and the
penalty for failing to satisfy the QoS latency requirements.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we discuss the considered system model
and the primary assumptions made. We consider a general
heterogeneous deployment scenario for cloudlets over access
networks, where cloudlets from the same as well as different
service providers are installed. The total number of competing
cloudlets in the network is N and C = {1,2, . . .,N} denotes the
set of cloudlets, where N ≥ 2. The set of competing cloudlets
C in a network is common knowledge [30].
(a) Job Request Service Process: We assume that the num-
ber of processors in each of the cloudlets is finite. Furthermore,
we assume that each unit processor present in the network has
similar job processing capabilities. By assuming that the ith
cloudlet has a single processor, the average service rate is µi
(jobs/s) depending on the incoming job requests. Therefore, µi
indicates a parametric description of the job requests arrived at
the ith cloudlet. We further assume that incoming job requests
from mobile devices are maximally parallelized by cloudlets.
By using Google cluster-usage traces, the authors of [31]
showed that exponential distribution fits perfectly with the job
request arrival and the corresponding service times. Hence,
we model the cloudlets as M/M/1 queuing systems while
considering the aggregated processing rate of all processors
[21]. If the ith cloudlet has ni number of processors with
complete parallel processing enabled, then the required service
rate for supporting the total CPU cycles of all the job requests
received within a time-slot rate can be determined as µii = niµi .
Moreover, when ith cloudlet offloads some job requests to its
neighboring j th cloudlet, then the modified service rate for the
respective job requests is given by µi j = nj µi .
(b) Job Request Arrival Process: We denote the average
job request arrival rate from all the corresponding mobile
devices to a cloudlet i ∈ C by λi . We presume that the network
has enough bandwidth and by counting the number of incom-
ing packets over each time-slot, the job request arrival rate λi
can be calculated. Each cloudlet prioritizes the processing of
the incoming job requests internally or offloads to a neigh-
boring cloudlet through some internal scheduling algorithm
(beyond the scope of this paper). As the average job request
arrival varies from time instance to time instance, we assume
that each λi is independently and uniformly distributed over
the support Λi = [0, λmaxi ],∀i ∈ C. Therefore, the computation
job request profile or true type of all the competing cloudlets
is represented as λ = (λ1, λ2, . . ., λN ) ∈Λ = (Λ1×Λ2× . . .×ΛN ).
In general, the job request arrival process to cloudlets is a non-
stationary process, but it possesses some pseudo-stationary
characteristics such that the mean job request arrival rate varies
gradually. This facilitates the cloudlets to predict the incoming
job request arrival rate by employing efficient traffic prediction
algorithms like auto-regressive and moving average (ARMA)
algorithm [32]. The transmission latency of the incoming job
requests and the intermediate transmission latencies with the
neighboring cloudlets are also estimated by each cloudlet [33].
Nonetheless, we keep the design of load-predictive algorithms
beyond the scope of this paper.
(c) QoS Latency Requirements of Job Requests: The
individual job requests from mobile devices demand a certain
4number of CPU cycles to process the jobs within a predefined
QoS latency target DQ [15]. However, in this paper, rather than
individual job requests, we are considering a batch of incoming
job requests to cloudlets. Thus, we denote the computational
and latency requirements of all the incoming job requests to
ith cloudlet by the consolidated tuple (µi, λi,DQ). We assume
that all job requests belong to a similar type of low-latency
applications and hence, the value of DQ is the same for all
the neighboring cloudlets. This implies that the duration of
each timeslot is also equal to DQ and if any highly overloaded
cloudlet cannot process some of its total incoming job requests
within DQ, it needs to drop those job requests and pay a
penalty for that. Recall that an M/M/1 queue provides only an
upper bound for the processing latency of a cloudlet with the
aggregated processing rate of all the processors, i.e., we are
considering the worst-case processing latency of the cloudlets.
With this model, we are also ensuring that all the incoming job
requests are processed within DQ when the average latency of
each cloudlet is equal to DQ.
(d) User Mobility Model: We assume that the mobile users
cannot move beyond the coverage area of a cloudlet within
1-10 ms, thus consider the quasi-static mobility model for
mobile users. This means that mobile users can be consid-
ered almost stationary to the corresponding cloudlets during
computation offloading period, but may move on later [15].
The cloudlets either start processing the job requests received
from corresponding mobile devices or strategically offload
a fraction of them to their neighboring cloudlets to satisfy
the QoS latency target DQ. If any cloudlet becomes highly
overloaded to process all the incoming job requests over a
certain timeslot and satisfy DQ, we consider that it needs to
pay a penalty as well as clear the pending job requests before
starting to process the jobs requests for the next timeslot.
IV. ECONOMIC AND NON-COOPERATIVE LOAD
BALANCING GAME AMONG CLOUDLETS
In this section, we formulate the load balancing prob-
lem among N ≥ 2 neighboring cloudlets from same as well
as different service providers as a continuous-kernel non-
cooperative game. In a practical deployment scenario, over-
loaded cloudlets intend to offload a fraction of its job requests
to its under-loaded neighboring cloudlets and the under-loaded
cloudlets intend to receive some additional job requests from
its overloaded neighboring cloudlets. The complete job request
offloading strategy space of all cloudlets is defined as a matrix
Φ = (ΦT1 ,Φ
T
2 , . . .,Φ
T
N )
T ⊂ RN×N , where ϕi = (ϕi1, ϕi2, . . ., ϕiN ) ∈
Φi ⊂ RN , ϕi j ∈ Φi j = [0,1] ⊂ R, and ∑Nj=1 ϕi j = 1,∀i ∈ C. Each
ϕi j denotes the fraction of job requests ith cloudlet offloads
to its j th neighboring cloudlet. In the most general setting,
neighboring cloudlets have non-homogeneous service rates
and the overall processing and queuing latency of the received
job requests at each cloudlet is given as follows (please refer
to Appendix A for the detailed analysis):
Ti(ϕi,ϕ−i) =
1
ϕiiλi +
∑
j 6=i ϕjiλj
©­­«
∑N
j=1
{
ϕjiλj
∏N
k=1,k 6=j(µki −ϕkiλk)
}
∏N
j=1(µji −ϕi jλj)
ª®®¬ . (1)
Nonetheless, in a stable market scenario, all the service
providers tend to install cloudlets with similar processing
capabilities (i.e., ni = nj,∀i, j) and similar service rates (i.e.,
µi = µj,∀i, j) to meet a standard quality of service for the same
customer base. Hence, the overall latency of the job requests
at ith cloudlet can be derived as follows:
Ti(ϕi,ϕ−i) =
1
µii − (1−∑j 6=i ϕi j)λi −∑j 6=i ϕjiλj . (2)
A. Economic and Non-cooperative Game Formulation
In this paper, we consider the most commonly used pricing
schemes e.g., pay-as-you-go policy, where users pay a fixed
price per job request without any long-term commitments [34].
For the total amount of incoming job requests from all the
connected mobile devices, each cloudlet receives a linearly
proportional price (Ω1) per workload. Each cloudlet pays a
linearly proportional price per workload (Ω2) for offloading
job requests to a neighboring cloudlet from a different service
provider and also, receives a linearly proportional price for
executing its neighbor’s offloaded jobs. The cloudlets can also
cooperate or bargain among themselves to decide the value
of Ω2, but this leads to a cooperative or bargaining game-
theoretic model, which is part of our future work. We define
a parameter γi j to distinguish the price for offloading a job
request to neighboring cloudlets as follows:
γi j =

1; if the neighboring cloudlet belongs to
a different service provider
0; if the neighboring cloudlet belongs to
the same service provider
This means that each ith cloudlet has to pay a price to j th
cloudlet to offload any job requests when it belongs to another
service provider, i.e. γi j = 1. Nonetheless, the cost parameter
Ω2 can also be considered as strategy of cloudlets that leads
to a cooperative game-theoretic model, which is part of our
future work. In addition to these, each cloudlet pays a penalty
price with a proportionality cost factor (Ω3) for exceeding
the QoS target latency DQ. In this work, we consider a linear
penalty price similar to the linear latency cost designed in [21].
Therefore, all the competing cloudlets with a utility function
UNi (ϕi,ϕ−i),∀i ∈ C, where ϕ−i = (ϕ1, . . .,ϕi−1,ϕi+1, . . .,ϕN ),
in the load balancing game intend to solve the maximization
problem as follows:
max
ϕi ∈Φi
UNi (ϕi,ϕ−i) = Ω1
λi
µii
+ Ω2
N∑
j=1, j 6=i
γjiϕji
λj
µii
−Ω2
N∑
j=1, j 6=i
γi jϕi j
λi
µj j
−Ω3
[(
1−
N∑
j=1, j 6=i
ϕi j
)
λi
µii
max
{
0,
(
tui +
1
µii − (1−∑j 6=i ϕi j)λi −∑j 6=i ϕjiλj −DQ
)}
+
N∑
j=1, j 6=i
ϕji
λj
µii
max
{
0,
(
tuj +
1
µii − (1−∑j 6=i ϕi j)λi −∑j 6=i ϕjiλj + tji −DQ
)}]
(3)
subject to 0 ≤ ϕi j ≤ 1,
N∑
j=1
ϕi j = 1. (4)
The first term in (3) denotes the total payment received by
the cloudlet from mobile users and is linearly proportional to
the average workload. The second term denotes the payment ith
5cloudlet receives from j th cloudlet to execute its offloaded job
requests and the third term denotes the payment ith cloudlet
makes to j th cloudlet for offloading job requests. Note that
these terms are essential to distinguish payments for offloading
job requests among heterogeneous cloudlets from the same as
well as different service providers. Finally, the fourth and fifth
terms denote the penalty ith cloudlet pays for overall latency
(sum of transmission, processing, and queueing latencies)
if it exceeds DQ against the total incoming job requests,
otherwise no penalty is applied. Note that we consider the
utility function only under the condition of stable operation,
i.e.,
[
µii −
(
1−∑j 6=i ϕi j ) λi −∑j 6=i ϕjiλj ] ≥ 0,∀i, j 6= i ∈ C. We
denote the average round-trip data transmission latency among
mobile devices and the corresponding ith cloudlet by tui .
Also, we denote the inter-cloudlet round-trip data transmission
latency by ti j,∀i, j 6= i ∈ C.
The utility of each cloudlet in this load balancing game is an
affine function when the total latency is within DQ, otherwise,
it becomes a non-linear function whose maximum value is
achieved at total end-to-end latency equal to DQ. Hence,
the cloudlets are always interested in gaining some economic
benefits by receiving some extra job requests from neighboring
cloudlets as long as the QoS latency requirement DQ is met
but, the utility starts to decrease beyond this point. More-
over, the individual rationality of each competing cloudlet is
maintained, because under all network conditions a default
utility, U0i = Ω1 λiµii −Ω3
λi
µii
max
{
0,
(
tui + 1µii−λi −DQ
)}
,∀i ∈ C
is ensured.
Furthermore, due to the utility function (3) and constraint
(4), which does not provide an explicit latency bound on
the participating cloudlets, even highly over-loaded cloudlets
can participate in the game and can offload some of the job
requests to the relatively under-loaded neighboring cloudlets.
This leads to a utility higher than the utility achieved without
participating in the game. Note that under such network load
conditions, the game formulation in [21] that has explicit delay
bound on participating cloudlets becomes infeasible and a
valid NE solution can not be computed. We prefer to inves-
tigate the NE of the game Γ, because none of the competing
cloudlets find it beneficial to deviate unilaterally from the NE
computational offload strategy ϕ∗ = (ϕ∗T1 ,ϕ
∗T
2 , . . .,ϕ
∗T
N ).
Lemma 4.1. The utility functions UNi (ϕi,ϕ−i),∀i ∈ C are
quasi-concave functions of ϕi .
Proof: Please refer to Appendix B.
Theorem 4.2. At least one pure strategy NE exists for the
game Γ = 〈C, (Φi)i∈C, (UNi (ϕi,ϕ−i))i∈C〉.
Proof: In the game Γ, the strategy spaces of all the
competing cloudlets Φi are compact and convex in nature.
The utility functions UNi (ϕi,ϕ−i),∀i ∈ C are continuous func-
tions of (ϕi,ϕ−i) with the condition of stable operation,[
µii −
(
1−∑j 6=i ϕi j ) λi −∑j 6=i ϕjiλj ] ≥ 0,∀i, j 6= i ∈ C. More-
over, we showed in Lemma 4.1 that UNi (ϕi,ϕ−i),∀i ∈ C
are quasi-concave functions of ϕi . These are the sufficient
conditions to ensure the existence of a pure strategy NE for
the non-cooperative load balancing game Γ.
B. Computation of the Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium
As the utility functions UNi (ϕi,ϕ−i),∀i ∈ C are non-
differentiable in nature, we cannot derive the best response
functions of the cloudlets by directly differentiating the utility
functions. Therefore, we use the necessary conditions, i.e.,
the first-order KKT conditions to compute the pure-strategy
NE [35]. To derive analytical closed-form expressions for NE
of the load balancing game, at first we consider only two
cloudlets and followed by we extend this analysis to a multi-
cloudlet game. The utility function of each ith cloudlet is
defined as follows:
U2i (ϕi,ϕ−i) = Ω1
λi
µii
+ Ω2γjiϕji
λj
µii
−Ω2γi jϕi j λi
µj j
−Ω3
[
(1−ϕi j) λi
µii
max
{
0,
(
tui +
1
µii − (1−ϕi j)λi −ϕjiλj −DQ
)}
+ϕji
λj
µii
max
{
0,
(
tuj +
1
µii − (1−ϕi j)λi −ϕjiλj + tji −DQ
)}]
.
(5)
Note that this utility definition (5) takes two different forms
depending on ith cloudlet meets or exceeds the QoS latency
target DQ. Therefore, the objective of an under-loaded cloudlet
is interpreted as follows:
Pu : max
ϕi ∈Φi
U2i (ϕi,ϕ−i) = Ω1
λi
µii
+ Ω2γjiϕji
λj
µii
−Ω2γi jϕi j λi
µj j
subject to 0 ≤ ϕi j ≤ 1,(
tuj +
1
µii − (1−ϕi j)λi −ϕjiλj + tji −DQ
)
≤ 0.
Similarly, the objective of an overloaded cloudlet is inter-
preted as follows:
Po : max
ϕi ∈Φi
U2i (ϕi,ϕ−i) = Ω1
λi
µii
+ Ω2γjiϕji
λj
µii
−Ω2γi jϕi j λi
µj j
−Ω3
[
(1−ϕi j) λi
µii
(
tui +
1
µii − (1−ϕi j)λi −ϕjiλj −DQ
)
+ϕji
λj
µii
(
tuj +
1
µii − (1−ϕi j)λi −ϕjiλj + tji −DQ
)]
subject to 0 ≤ ϕi j ≤ 1,(
tui +
1
µii − (1−ϕi j)λi −ϕjiλj −DQ
)
≥ 0.
Therefore, to show the uniqueness of NE of the game Γ, we
need to derive the NE under different network conditions, e.g.,
all cloudlets are under-loaded, all cloudlets are overloaded,
or some cloudlets are under-loaded and some cloudlets are
overloaded.
Case-1:
[(
tui + 1µii−λi
)
< DQ,
(
tuj + 1µ j j−λ j
)
< DQ
]
In this case, both the cloudlets are under-loaded and their
Lagrangian function can be written from Pu as follows:
Lui = Ω1
λi
µii
+ Ω2γjiϕji
λj
µii
−Ω2γi jϕi j λi
µj j
+αiϕi j + βi(1−ϕi j)
− ξi
(
tuj +
1
µii − (1−ϕi j)λi −ϕjiλj + tji −DQ
)
, (6)
6where αi, βi, ξi ≥ 0 are Lagrange multipliers corresponding to
the respective constraints. Thus, the necessary first-order KKT
conditions (FOC) ∀i, j 6= i ∈ C are derived as follows:
∂Lui
∂ϕi j
= −Ω2γi j λi
µj j
+αi − βi + ξi
[
λi
(µii − (1−ϕi j)λi −ϕjiλj)2
]
= 0. (7)
In addition to this, the complementary slackness conditions
(CSC) ∀i, j 6= i ∈ C are written as follows:
αiϕi j = 0, (8)
βi(1−ϕi j) = 0, (9)
ξi
(
tuj +
1
µii − (1−ϕi j)λi −ϕjiλj + tji −DQ
)
= 0. (10)
In this case, both the cloudlets have sufficient computational
resources to meet the QoS latency target and hence, (tuj +
1
µii−(1−ϕi j )λi−ϕ j iλ j + tji −DQ) < 0. Therefore, from (10) we get
ξ∗i = ξ
∗
j = 0 and it is easy to show that the unique NE solution is
ϕ∗i j = ϕ
∗
ji = 0. Intuitively, this implies that none of the cloudlets
offload any job requests to each other and from FOC (7) and
CSC (8)-(10), we get the corresponding values of Lagrange
multipliers α∗i = Ω2γi j
λi
µ j j
, β∗i = 0, α
∗
j = Ω2γji
λ j
µii
, and β∗j = 0.
A more detailed analysis is shown in Appendix C.
Case-2:
[(
tui + 1µii−λi
)
≥ DQ,
(
tuj + 1µ j j−λ j
)
≥ DQ
]
In this case, both the cloudlets are overloaded and hence,
the corresponding Lagrangian function from Po:
Loi = Ω1
λi
µii
+ Ω2γjiϕji
λj
µii
−Ω2γi jϕi j λi
µj j
−Ω3
[
(1−ϕi j) λi
µii
(
tui +
1
µii − (1−ϕi j)λi −ϕjiλj −DQ
)
+ϕji
λj
µii
(
tuj +
1
µii − (1−ϕi j)λi −ϕjiλj + tji −DQ
)]
+αiϕi j + βi(1−ϕi j)
+ ξi
(
tui +
1
µii − (1−ϕi j)λi −ϕjiλj −DQ
)
. (11)
Again, the necessary FOC and CSC ∀i, j 6= i ∈ C are derived
as follows:
∂Loi
∂ϕi j
= −Ω2γi j λi
µj j
+ Ω3
λi
µii
[
tui +
µii
(µii − (1−ϕi j)λi −ϕjiλj)2 −DQ
]
+αi − βi − ξi
[
λi
(µii − (1−ϕi j)λi −ϕjiλj)2
]
= 0, (12)
αiϕi j = 0, (13)
βi(1−ϕi j) = 0, (14)
ξi
(
tui +
1
µii − (1−ϕi j)λi −ϕjiλj −DQ
)
= 0. (15)
As both the cloudlets are overloaded, therefore, in this case,
(tui + 1µii−(1−ϕi j )λi−ϕ j iλ j −DQ) > 0 and (15) yields ξ∗i = ξ∗j = 0.
In this case also, it is obvious that the unique NE strategy for
both the cloudlets is not to offload any job requests to each
other, i.e., ϕ∗i j = ϕ
∗
ji = 0. Along with this, from FOC (12) and
CSC (13)-(15), we get the corresponding values of Lagrange
multipliers α∗i = Ω2γi j
λi
µ j j
−Ω3 λiµii
[
tui + µii(µii−λi )2
]
, β∗i = 0, α
∗
j =
Ω2γji
λ j
µii
−Ω3 λ jµ j j
[
tuj +
µ j j
(µ j j−λ j )2
]
, and β∗j = 0.
Case-3:
[(
tui + 1µii−λi
)
≥ DQ,
(
tuj + 1µ j j−λ j
)
< DQ
]
In this case, we consider that ith cloudlet is overloaded
but j th cloudlet is under-loaded. Thus, ith cloudlet needs to
offload some job requests to j th cloudlet to meet the QoS
target latency DQ, as long as j th cloudlet does not exceed
DQ. This implies that 0 < ϕ∗i j < 1 and ϕ
∗
ji = 0. Moreover,
we get (tui + 1µii−(1−ϕi j )λi−ϕ j iλ j − DQ) = 0, ξ∗i > 0 and (tuj +
1
µii−(1−ϕi j )λi−ϕ j iλ j + tji −DQ) ≤ 0, ξ∗j = 0. Considering the FOC
(12) and CSC (13)-(15) for ith cloudlet and FOC (7) and
CSC (8)-(10) for j th cloudlet, we get the following unique
NE solution:
ϕ∗i j = 1−
1
λi
[
µii − 1DQ − tui
]
≤ 1
λi
[
µj j −λj − 1DQ − tui − ti j
]
. (16)
Along with this, we get the Lagrange multiplier values
α∗i = 0, β
∗
i = 0, α
∗
j = 0, and β
∗
j = 0. It is interesting to note
from (16) that for the overloaded ith cloudlet, the computation
offloading decision is not entirely controlled by itself. As long
as the under-loaded j th cloudlet can process the entire extra
load from ith cloudlet, ϕ∗i j = 1− 1λi
[
µii − 1DQ−tui
]
is acceptable.
However, when j th cloudlet cannot process the entire extra
load, then the offload fraction is not allowed to exceed
the upper-bound, and hence, ϕ∗i j =
1
λi
[
µj j −λj − 1DQ−tui−ti j
]
.
Therefore, from the above analysis we showed that we can
compute a unique NE for our proposed load balancing game
among competing cloudlets.
Now, we extend the NE solution for a general N ≥ 2
cloudlet load balancing scenario. From the above analysis,
it is evident that when all the cloudlets are under-loaded or
overloaded, then the NE is not to offload any job requests to
each other, i.e., ϕ∗i = 0. However, when some cloudlets are
under-loaded and some are overloaded, we need to propose a
general solution method. As in Case-3 we observed that the
NE load balancing strategies are not entirely controlled by
the overloaded cloudlets but also the under-loaded cloudlets,
hence we introduce a new set of decision variables for each
ith cloudlet denoting the fraction of job requests received from
all j th cloudlets i.e., ψi = (ψ1i,ψ2i, . . .,ψNi) with the equality
constraints, ϕji = ψji,∀i, j 6= i ∈ C. We can mark the Nu under-
loaded cloudlets and No overloaded cloudlets by observing
λi such that Nu + No = N . Moreover, the latency constraints
and FOC for under-loaded cloudlets respectively are written
as follows:
(
tuj +
1
µii − (1−∑j 6=i ϕi j)λi −∑j 6=i ψjiλj + tji −DQ
)
≤ 0,∀i ∈ C,
(17)
∇ϕiUNi +∇ϕi
[
αTi ϕi + β
T
i (1−ϕi)
−ξTi
(
tuj +
1
µii − (1−∑j 6=i ϕi j)λi −∑j 6=i ψjiλj + tji −DQ
)]
= 0.
(18)
Similarly, the latency constraints and FOC for the over-
7loaded cloudlets respectively are written as follows:(
tui +
1
µii − (1−∑j 6=i ϕi j)λi −∑j 6=i ψjiλj −DQ
)
≥ 0,∀i ∈ C,
(19)
∇ϕiUNi +∇ϕi
[
αTi ϕi + β
T
i (1−ϕi)
+ξTi
(
tui +
1
µii − (1−∑j 6=i ϕi j)λi −∑j 6=i ψjiλj −DQ
)]
= 0.
(20)
Theorem 4.3. The constrained optimization problem P is
equivalent to the game Γ = 〈C, (Φi)i∈C, (UNi (ϕi,ϕ−i))i∈C〉.
P : Minimize
N∑
i=1
[
αTi ϕi + β
T
i (1−ϕi)
]
−
Nu∑
i=1
ξTi
(
tuj +
1
µii − (1−∑j 6=i ϕi j)λi −∑j 6=i ψjiλj + tji −DQ
)
+
No∑
i=1
ξTi
(
tui +
1
µii − (1−∑j 6=i ϕi j)λi −∑j 6=i ψjiλj −DQ
)
subject to αi, βi, ξi  0,∀i ∈ C,
0 ≤ ϕi j ≤ 1,
N∑
j=1
ϕi j = 1,∀i, j 6= i ∈ C,
ϕji = ψji,∀i, j 6= i ∈ C,
constraints (17)-(20),∀i ∈ C.
Please refer to Appendix D for the proof. Nonetheless, it is
noteworthy that the problem P is not a convex optimization
problem. Hence, we can reformulate the problem as a convex
optimization problem by adding the squares of left hand sides
of (18) and (20) to the objective [36]. This problem now can
be solved by using a gradient-projection algorithm or any
commercially available solver package. An algorithm to solve
the game Γ is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Fig. 1: A simplified schematic diagram to show the information
exchange among N competing cloudlets and a neutral mediator.
Algorithm 1 Projection Algorithm with Constant Step Size
1: Input: Network parameters µii , λi , tui , ti j,∀i, j 6= i ∈ C.
2: Output: The pure-strategy NE of the non-cooperative load
balancing game.
3: Initialization: Choose any Lagrange multipliers α(0), β(0),
ξ (0) ≥ 0, step size ω > 0, and tolerance limit  > 0. Set the
index t = 0.
4: if all cloudlets are under-loaded, i.e., (tui + 1µii−λi ) < DQ,
or all cloudlets are overloaded, i.e., (tui + 1µii−λi ) ≥ DQ
then choose not to offload, i.e., set ϕ∗ = IN : STOP;
5: else identify the FOC of the under-loaded cloudlets as
(17)-(18) and the FOC of the overloaded cloudlets as
(19)-(20). Use the corresponding CSC to formulate the
objective function of P.
6: if ϕ(t)(χ(t)), α(t)(χ(t)), β(t)(χ(t)), ξ (t)(χ(t)) satisfies the
desirable tolerance limit  then STOP;
7: With given χ(t), compute ϕ(t)(χ(t)), α(t)(χ(t)), β(t)(χ(t)),
ξ (t)(χ(t)) as the solution of convexified optimization prob-
lem P;
8: Update the Lagrange multipliers χ corresponding to the
constraints of P by gradient projection as follows:
χ(t+1) = [χ(t) +ωΘ(χ(t))]+, (21)
where Θ is the feasible set of P.
9: Set t← t + 1; go to Step 6.
V. CENTRALIZED LOAD BALANCING FRAMEWORK
Private information of a cloudlet is defined as the informa-
tion that is known only to that cloudlet and no other entity in
the network [37]. The competing cloudlets are non-cooperative
and rational utility maximizers, whereas a neutral mediator,
on the other hand does not have any utility associated with
the incoming job requests. The mediator acts like a supervisor
that ensures fair participation of all the competing cloudlets in
the market competition and installs a computational facility in
the proximity of the competing cloudlets to compute the NE
for all the cloudlets over that period by using a centralized
algorithm and inform the cloudlets, as shown in Fig. 1. In a
centralized framework, the mediator firstly addresses the pref-
erence elicitation problem to elicit truthful information from
competing cloudlets by imposing efficient mechanisms on the
cloudlets who periodically reveal their private information
about incoming job requests. We represent the revealed type
profile of the competing cloudlets as λˆ = (λˆ1, λˆ2, . . ., λˆN ) ∈ Λ.
However, we assume that cloudlets usually truthfully reveal
other network parameters like µii , tui , and ti j , because µii
is dependent on the type of job requests and usually do not
change frequently, and tui , ti j can be cross-verified as they
are reported by multiple cloudlets. This mechanism provides
us rules/guidelines on how the cloudlets and the mediator
should communicate with each other. Secondly, the mediator
addresses the preference aggregation problem to compute the
NE load balancing strategies for each cloudlet based on the
communicated information, to induce the desired strategic
behavior from the cloudlets [37]. The fundamental stages of
the overall control design are summarized below:
(a) A load-predictive learning algorithm is executed by each
8cloudlet at every nth time-slot by using the information
from (n−1)th time-slot to predict the incoming job request
arrival rate of the (n+ 1)th time-slot.
(b) Each cloudlet also estimates the transmission latency of
the incoming job requests by using the given stochastic
parameters of the wireless and optical interfaces between
mobile devices and cloudlets. Each cloudlet also estimates
the intermediate transmission latencies with its neighbor-
ing cloudlets.
(c) Each cloudlet communicates their latest predictions on
incoming job request arrival rate and the transmission
latencies to the centralized computational facility installed
by the mediator.
(d) The mediator employs a centralized algorithm to computes
the NE computation offloading strategies for broadcasting
to all the competing cloudlets before the (n+1)th time-slot.
(e) Accordingly, the cloudlets offload some fraction of their
total incoming job requests to their neighboring cloudlets
when the (n+ 1)th time-slot actually arrives.
A. Incentive Compatible Mechanism Design
In this section, we show that our proposed load balancing
game is incentive compatible and ensures the truthful reve-
lation of private information from the competing cloudlets.
To take advantage of the analytical closed-form expressions
derived in Section IV, at first we consider the load balancing
game between two cloudlets and show that truthful revelation
of private information to the mediator is a weakly-dominated
strategy for ith cloudlet irrespective of the information shared
by j th cloudlet. Recall that the true types of the cloudlets
are (λi, λj) and their revealed types to the mediator are
(λˆi, λˆj). With the revealed information, the mediator solves
the load balancing game and broadcasts the NE load balancing
strategies ϕˆ∗i j and ϕˆ
∗
ji to the competing cloudlets. The utility
of each cloudlet based on its true type is U2i and the utility
computed by each cloudlet based on their revealed type is
denoted by Uˆ2i . The incentive mechanism design is truthful if
(Uˆ2i −U2i ) ≤ 0 always holds true.
Case-1: [Both cloudlets are under-loaded]
Sub-case-1A: A truly under-loaded cloudlet cannot improve
its utility by revealing a job request arrival rate such that it
is still under-loaded. In this case, both ith and j th cloudlets
are under-loaded but, they are not aware of each other’s load
conditions. Mathematically, we express this scenario from ith
cloudlet’s perspective as (tui + 1µii−λi ) < DQ, (tuj +
1
µ j j−λˆ j ) <
DQ. Now, if the revealed type λˆi < λi or, λˆi ≥ λi such that
(tui + 1µii−λˆi ) < DQ, then the NE does not change from the true
NE, i.e., ϕˆ∗i j = 0 and ϕˆ
∗
ji = 0. Hence, the utility of i
th cloudlet
does not improve, because (Uˆ2i −U2i ) = Ω1 λiµii −Ω1
λi
µii
= 0.
This means that if the revealed λˆi is either less than or greater
than actual λi such that the ith cloudlet is still under-loaded,
then the NE does not change and the utility remains the same,
because the payment received from mobile users in Uˆ2i always
remains same as in U2i .
Sub-case-1B: The utility of a truly under-loaded cloudlet
decreases if it reveals itself as overloaded when the neigh-
boring cloudlet is under-loaded. If λˆi ≥ λi such that (tui +
1
µii−λˆi ) ≥ DQ, then the i
th cloudlet needs to offload ϕˆ∗i j λˆi job
requests to the j th cloudlet. In this case, the ith cloudlet has
revealed λˆi ≥ λi such that it is considered to be overloaded
and hence, the NE based on revealed information makes
it to offload some job requests to the j th cloudlet. This
decreases its utility of ith cloudlet due to the associated
payment. The NE with the revealed information is ϕˆ∗i j =
1− 1
λˆi
[
µii − 1DQ−tui
]
≤ 1
λˆi
[
µj j − λˆj − 1DQ−tui−ti j
]
and ϕˆ∗ji = 0.
Clearly, the utility of the ith cloudlet decreases because
(Uˆ2i −U2i ) = Ω1 λiµii −Ω2γi j ϕˆ∗i j
λˆi
µ j j
−Ω1 λiµii = −Ω2γi j ϕˆ∗i j
λˆi
µ j j
< 0.
Case-2: [One overloaded and one under-loaded cloudlet]
Sub-case-2A: The utility of a truly overloaded cloudlet
decreases or remains same if it reveals itself as more over-
loaded when the neighboring cloudlet is under-loaded. We
consider (tui + 1µii−λi ) ≥ DQ, (tuj + 1µ j j−λˆ j ) < DQ, i.e., the i
th
cloudlet is overloaded and the j th cloudlet is under-loaded. If
λˆi ≥ λi , then ith cloudlet offloads more or same amount of job
requests, depending on λˆj , i.e., ϕˆ∗i j λˆi ≥ ϕ∗i jλi and ϕˆ∗i j, ϕ∗i j can
be computed from (16) with ϕˆ∗ji = 0. Thus, the utility of the i
th
cloudlet decreases because (Uˆ2i −U2i ) = Ω1 λiµii −Ω2γi j ϕˆ∗i j
λˆi
µ j j
−
Ω1 λiµii +Ω2γi jϕ
∗
i j
λi
µ j j
=−Ω2 γi jµ j j (ϕˆ∗i j λˆi−ϕ∗i jλi) < 0. Therefore, an
overloaded cloudlet revealing itself as more overloaded, needs
to offload more than actually needed to meet the QoS target
latency, and hence the utility decreases.
Sub-case-2B: The utility of a truly overloaded cloudlet
decreases by revealing itself as less overloaded or under-
loaded when the neighboring cloudlet is under-loaded. If
λˆi < λi but (tui + 1µii−λˆi ) ≥ DQ, then i
th cloudlet offloads
less than that required to meet the QoS target latency, i.e.,
ϕˆ∗i j λˆi ≤ ϕ∗i jλi and ϕˆ∗i j, ϕ∗i j can be computed from (16) with
ϕˆ∗ji = 0. This implies that i
th cloudlet needs to pay lesser
incentives than before but the penalty for latency decreases
its utility value as follows:
(Uˆ2i −U2i ) = −Ω2
γi j
µj j
(ϕˆ∗i j λˆi −ϕ∗i jλi)
−Ω3
(
λi − ϕˆ∗i j λˆi
µii
) [
tui +
1
µii − (λi − ϕˆ∗i j λˆi)
−DQ
]
. (22)
We shall soon derive a necessary condition between Ω2
and Ω3 that ensured that (Uˆ2i −U2i ) ≤ 0 for expressions like
(22). Again, if λˆi < λi such that (tui + 1µii−λˆi ) < DQ, then i
th
cloudlet is revealed as under-loaded and hence it is not allowed
to offload any job requests. Hence, the NE solution with the
revealed information is ϕˆ∗i j = 0, ϕˆ
∗
ji = 0 and the utility of i
th
cloudlet decreases due to the latency penalty as follows:
(Uˆ2i −U2i ) = Ω2γi jϕ∗i j
λi
µj j
−Ω3 λi
µii
[
tui +
1
µii −λi −DQ
]
. (23)
Sub-case-2C: The utility of a truly under-loaded cloudlet
remains unchanged or decreases by revealing itself as more
or less under-loaded when the neighboring cloudlet is over-
loaded. We consider (tui + 1µii−λi ) < DQ, (tuj +
1
µ j j−λˆ j ) ≥ DQ,
i.e., the ith cloudlet is under-loaded and the j th cloudlet is
overloaded. In this case, if λˆi < λi or, λˆi ≥ λi such that (tui +
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µii−λˆi ) < DQ and can process the entire job request offload re-
quests ϕˆ∗ji λˆj from the j
th cloudlet, then the NE solution is ϕˆ∗i j =
0 and ϕˆ∗ji = 1− 1λˆ j
[
µj j − 1DQ−tu j
]
≤ 1
λˆ j
[
µii − λˆi − 1DQ−tu j−tj i
]
.
Thus, the utility of the ith cloudlet remains unchanged because
the same amount of job requests are offloaded irrespective
of the falsely revealed information and hence, (Uˆ2i −U2i ) =
Ω1 λiµii + Ω2γji ϕˆ
∗
ji
λˆ j
µii
−Ω1 λiµii −Ω2γji ϕˆ∗ji
λˆ j
µii
= 0.
Again, if λˆi ≥ λi such that (tui + 1µii−λˆi ) < DQ but cannot
process the entire job request offload requests ϕˆ∗ji λˆj from the
j th cloudlet, then lesser amount of job requests are offloaded,
i.e., ϕˆ∗ji λˆj ≤ ϕ∗ji λˆj and ϕˆ∗ji, ϕ∗ji can be computed from (16)
with ϕˆ∗i j = 0. This implies that the utility of the i
th cloudlet
decreases because (Uˆ2i −U2i ) = Ω1 λiµii + Ω2γji ϕˆ∗ji
λˆ j
µii
−Ω1 λiµii +
Ω2γjiϕ∗ji
λˆ j
µii
= −Ω2 γj iµii (ϕ∗ji λˆj − ϕˆ∗ji λˆj) < 0. Therefore, in this
case, an under-loaded cannot achieve a better utility by re-
vealing a higher amount of job requests than the true value.
Finally, if λˆi < λi but actually ith cloudlet cannot process
the entire extra load from j th cloudlet, then ϕˆ∗ji λˆj ≥ ϕ∗ji λˆj and
ϕˆ∗ji, ϕ
∗
ji can be computed from (16) with ϕˆ
∗
i j = 0. However,
the ith cloudlet fails to meet the QoS latency target and the
latency penalty decreases the utility in spite of getting some
extra incentives as follows:
(Uˆ2i −U2i ) = Ω2γji ϕˆ∗ji
λˆj
µii
−Ω2γjiϕ∗ji
λˆj
µii
−Ω3 λi
µii
[
tui +
1
µii −λi − ϕˆ∗ji λˆj
−DQ
]
−Ω3
ϕˆ∗ji λˆj
µii
[
tuj +
1
µii −λi − ϕˆ∗ji λˆj
+ tji −DQ
]
. (24)
Therefore, we also verified that in this case, any under-
loaded cloudlet also cannot achieve a better utility by revealing
lower amount of job requests than the true value.
Case-3: [Both cloudlets are overloaded]
Sub-case-3A: A truly overloaded cloudlet cannot improve
its utility by revealing a job request arrival rate such that
it is still overloaded. In this case, (tui + 1µii−λi ) ≥ DQ, (tuj +
1
µ j j−λˆ j ) ≥ DQ. Now, λˆi ≥ λi or, λˆi < λi such that (tui +
1
µii−λˆi ) ≥
DQ, then the NE is same as the true NE, i.e., ϕˆ∗i j = 0 and
ϕˆ∗ji = 0. Hence, the utility of i
th cloudlet does not improve, be-
cause (Uˆ2i −U2i ) = Ω1 λiµii −Ω3
λi
µii
[
tui + 1µii−λi −DQ
]
−Ω1 λiµii +
Ω3 λiµii
[
tui + 1µii−λi −DQ
]
= 0.
Sub-case-3B: The utility of a truly overloaded cloudlet
decreases if it reveals itself as under-loaded when the neigh-
boring cloudlet is overloaded. If λˆi < λi such that (tui +
1
µii−λˆi ) < DQ, then the i
th cloudlet is considered as under-
loaded and j th cloudlet offloads some job requests to it.
The NE based on the revealed information is ϕˆ∗i j = 0 and
ϕˆ∗ji = 1 − 1λˆ j
[
µj j − 1DQ−tu j
]
≤ 1
λˆ j
[
µii − λˆi − 1DQ−tu j−tj i
]
. This
may help the ith cloudlet to earn some extra incentives but
the latency penalty decreases the utility as follows:
(Uˆ2i −U2i ) = Ω2γji ϕˆ∗ji
λˆj
µii
+ Ω3
λi
µii
[
tui +
1
µii −λi −DQ
]
−Ω3 λi
µii
[
tui +
1
µii −λi − ϕˆ∗ji λˆj
−DQ
]
−Ω3
ϕˆ∗ji λˆj
µii
[
tuj +
1
µii −λi − ϕˆ∗ji λˆj
+ tji −DQ
]
. (25)
Clearly, the above analysis shows that we ensured that
any cloudlet cannot achieve a better utility by revealing false
job request arrival rate and the truthful revelation of all the
cloudlets is a weakly-dominated strategy, irrespective of the
information shared by the neighboring cloudlets. Note that
the load balancing game among N ≥ 2 cloudlets is a direct
linear extension from the game between two cloudlets. Thus,
all the properties of the NE solution remain consistent and the
incentive mechanism design is also applicable.
Proposition 5.1. For the successful implementation of the
proposed incentive mechanism with our non-cooperative
load balancing game among competing cloudlets, Ω2 ≥
Ω3
[
max{tui}+ 1max{µii } + max{ti j} −DQ
]
,∀i, j 6= i ∈ C is a nec-
essary condition.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix E.
VI. DECENTRALIZED LOAD BALANCING FRAMEWORK
In a distributed cloudlet network, the incoming job request
arrival rate λi to each cloudlet i ∈ C is known only to that
cloudlet and no other entity in the network. We still assume
that the competing cloudlets are non-cooperative and rational
utility maximizers and hence, they do not share this private in-
formation with each other. Therefore, a reinforcement learning
automata-based algorithm helps the cloudlets to independently
make load balancing decisions only from their private informa-
tion and to aid this decision-making process, we formulate an
economic and non-cooperative game with a unique NE at both
overloaded and under-loaded network conditions. Moreover,
some particular characteristics of the underlying game formu-
lation help to reduce the search space of the reinforcement
learning algorithm and improve the convergence rate of the
algorithm to a great extent. The fundamental stages of the
overall control design are summarized below:
(a) A load-predictive learning algorithm is executed by each
cloudlet at every nth time-slot by using the information
from (n−1)th time-slot to predict the incoming job request
arrival rate of the (n+ 1)th time-slot.
(b) Each cloudlet also estimates the transmission latency of
the incoming job requests by using the given stochastic
parameters of the wireless and optical interfaces between
mobile devices and cloudlets. Each cloudlet also estimates
the intermediate transmission latencies with its neighbor-
ing cloudlets.
(c) Based on this learned information, each cloudlet shares
a random amount of its job requests to the neighboring
cloudlets, depending on the latest probability distribution
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over its strategy space and observes the utility and rewards
received. Based on the reward values received at nth and
(n− 1)th time-slots, each cloudlet updates the probability
distribution over its strategy space for (n+ 1)th time-slot.
A. Distributed Reinforcement Learning Algorithm
In this subsection, we design a continuous-action reinforce-
ment learning automata-based algorithm for learning the NE
of the continuous-kernel non-cooperative load balancing game
formulated in Section IV. At first, we define the mixed-strategy
of each ith cloudlet as continuous probability density function
(PDF) fi(ϕi) over its pure-strategy space Φi . Therefore, the
probability of randomly choosing an action within a close
neighborhood of ϕi j by ith cloudlet can be determined from
the corresponding PDF fi j(ϕi j). The complete mixed-strategy
of all the cloudlets is defined as F := f1 × ... × fN over
the complete pure-strategy space Φ. When each ith cloudlet
chooses an action ϕi j , i.e., offloads ϕi jλi job requests to
neighboring j th cloudlets, then the environment responds with
a random reward Ri(ϕi,ϕ−i) ∈ [0,1], which is defined as:
Ri(ϕi,ϕ−i) =
UNi (λ,ϕi,ϕ−i)
max{Ω1,Ω2,Ω3} . (26)
In the load balancing game, with a continuous-action rein-
forcement learning automata-based algorithm, each ith cloudlet
starts with uniform probability distributions as their mixed-
strategies over their individual pure-strategy action spaces and
keeps on updating the PDFs based on the received rewards in
the following time-slots to ultimately find their pure-strategy
NE [38]. After exploring an action ϕ(n)i ∈ Φi during nth time-
slot, the PDFs are updated for (n + 1)th time-slot by the
following update rule:
f (n+1)i (ϕi) = χ
(n)
[
f (n)i (ϕi)
+Θ(n)
(
R(n)i −R(n−1)i
)
exp
−
1
2
(
ϕi −ϕ(n)i
σ(n)
)2
 , (27)
where, Θ is the learning rate parameter, σ is the spreading
rate parameter and χ is a normalization factor so that∫+∞
−∞ f
(n+1)dz = 1, for any z. Note that, our proposed reinforce-
ment learning automata algorithm (27) is essentially a gradient
bandit algorithm, based on the idea of stochastic gradient
ascent algorithms [39]. Moreover, the term (R(n)i −R(n−1)i ) used
in this model makes this algorithm highly robust in tracking
a non-stationary job request arrival process. The PDFs are
continuously updated by the cloudlets based on their private
information and rewards received at every time-slot to learn
the pure-strategy NE of the non-cooperative load balancing
game [40].
Theorem 6.1. The continuous-action reinforcement learn-
ing automata-based algorithm with update rule (27) converges
to the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative
load balancing game.
Please refer to Appendix F for the proof. Although, the con-
vergence of the proposed algorithm is guaranteed but, we can
speed up the convergence rate of the algorithm several times
Algorithm 2 Distributed Reinforcement Learning Automata-
based Algorithm for learning NE of the Load Balancing Game
1: Initialization: Set the iteration index n = 0 and f (n)i j (ϕi j) =
uniform(Φi j),∀i, j ∈ C.
2: Output: The pure-strategy NE of the non-cooperative load
balancing game.
3: if ith cloudlet is under-loaded, i.e., (tui + 1µi−λi ) < DQ then
choose not to offload, i.e., ϕ(n)i = 0;
4: else ith cloudlet randomly choose an action ϕ(n)i based on
its latest mixed-strategy f (n)i (ϕi).
5: if j th cloudlet is overloaded or partially processes the jobs
received from all ith cloudlets then indicate all ith cloudlets
that only ψˆi jλi jobs are processed (0 ≤ ψˆi j < ϕi j), where
ψˆi jλi are chosen according to the ratio of ϕi jλi .
6: At the end of nth time-slot, each ith cloudlet receives a
reward R(n)i from the environment.
7: Each ith cloudlet update their mixed-strategy f (n+1)i (ϕi) by
the reinforcement learning automata for ϕ(n)i ∈ Φi:
f (n+1)i (ϕi) = χ
(n)
[
f (n)i (ϕi)
+Θ(n)
(
R(n)i −R(n−1)i
)
exp
−
1
2
(
ϕi −ϕ(n)i
σ(n)
)2

8: Set n← n+ 1; go to Step 3.
more by scaffolding our understanding about the underlying
load balancing game. We observe that whenever some cloudlet
is in under-loaded condition, i.e., (tui + 1µii−λi ) < DQ, its NE
strategy is not to offload any job requests to its neighboring
cloudlets. Thus, all cloudlets can update their PDFs accord-
ingly without exploring many job request offloading strategies
as long as the under-load condition persists. In addition to
this, during overload condition, i.e., (tui + 1µii−λi ) ≥ DQ, each
cloudlet will offload only a portion of the received job requests
and try to shift the peak of the PDF fi j(ϕi j) around the pure
strategy NE solution ϕ∗i j = 1− 1λi
[
µii − 1DQ−tui
]
, such that it
can meet DQ with the rest of the job requests by itself. Hence,
the corresponding search spaces can be reduced accordingly.
However, as each cloudlet is unaware about the load condition
of its neighboring cloudlets, an occasional feedback mecha-
nism is required from the neighboring cloudlets to indicate
that whenever a cloudlet is completely or partially unable
to process the job requests received from its neighbors. This
implies that when ith cloudlet offloads ϕi jλi job requests to j th
cloudlet, it indicates that only ψˆi jλi jobs are processed, where
0 ≤ ψˆi j < ϕi j . Therefore, in such cases, the ith cloudlet updates
the PDF by using ψˆi j in (27) instead of ϕi j . Furthermore, when
ith cloudlet is under-loaded and receives job requests from
multiple cloudlets but can partially process the job requests
i.e., (tui + 1µii−λi ) < DQ but (tuj +
1
µii−λi−∑i 6= j ϕ j iλ j + tji) ≥ DQ
the remaining job processing capacity of the ith cloudlet,
(µii − λi − 1DQ−tu j−tj i ) is distributed according to the ratio of
ϕjiλj . The proposed algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 2.
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(a) µii = 1000 jobs/s and λi variance = 0-400 jobs/s, ∀i ∈ C.
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(b) µii = 1000 jobs/s and λi variance = 0-400 jobs/s, ∀i ∈ C.
Fig. 2: Comparison of performance between our proposed game and
other games proposed in [21], [22] in terms of end-to-end latency
and utility values with high variance (0-400 jobs/s) in incoming job
request arrival rates among neighboring cloudlets.
VII. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we investigate various behavioural aspects of
the proposed load balancing strategy through numerical eval-
uations. For this purpose, we consider a set of 10 neighboring
cloudlets from same as well as different service providers.
In this work, we consider average processing rate µii varies
within 1000-1500 jobs/s and incoming job request to each
cloudlet λi varies within 0-1500 jobs/s. The QoS latency target
considered is DQ = 10 msec. We consider the average value
of latency between mobile users and cloudlets tui as 2 msec.
The intermediate transmission latency between neighboring
cloudlets ti j varies within 0.5-1 [2]. The optimal values of
proportionality price factors Ω1, Ω2, and Ω3 can be determined
by studying the market equilibrium conditions for providing
cloud-based services [41]. In actual practice, sometimes the
proper price factors are also determined by applying the
multiple criteria decision-making theory [42]. However, in this
work we arbitrarily choose Ω1 = 5× 103, Ω2 = 8× 102, and
Ω3 = 1× 104, such that our necessary game design condition
Ω2 ≥ Ω3
[
max{tui}+ 1max{µii } + max{ti j} −DQ
]
,∀i, j 6= i ∈ C is
satisfied. Moreover, for our gradient projection algorithm to
compute NE of the load balancing game, we choose a step
size ω = 0.1, and a tolerance limit  = 10−4.
In Fig. 2a, we compare average end-to-end latency of all
the participating cloudlets against job request arrival rate with
our currently proposed game and games proposed in [21]
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(a) µii = 1000 jobs/s and λi variance = 0-200 jobs/s, ∀i ∈ C.
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(b) µii = 1000 jobs/s and λi variance = 0-200 jobs/s, ∀i ∈ C.
Fig. 3: Comparison of performance between our proposed game and
other games proposed in [21], [22] in terms of end-to-end latency
and utility values with moderate variance (0-200 jobs/s) in incoming
job request arrival rates among neighboring cloudlets.
(labeled as “ref. game-1”) and [22] (labeled as “ref. game-
2”), respectively. In this case, we consider a high variance
in job request arrival rates among under and overloaded
cloudlets (within 0-400 jobs/s) and the service rates of all
the cloudlets are µii = 1000 jobs/s. We see that the ref. game-
1 performs best when the load condition is low or moderate
as it always tries to minimize end-to-end latency. Under these
conditions, our proposed game as well as ref. game-2 performs
slightly poorer as these models do not require the cloudlets to
offload anything. However, ref. game-2 allows the cloudlets
to offload job requests after reaching a certain threshold in
incoming job requests and their latency performance begins
to improve. Nonetheless, under high load conditions, when all
the cloudlets become sufficiently overloaded, our game also
allows the cloudlets to strategically offload some job requests
and latency performance becomes relatively better than ref.
game-1 and ref. game-2. This is because it is ensured in our
game that all the under-loaded cloudlets meet the QoS latency
target DQ. The over-loaded cloudlets may exceed DQ, but they
are allowed to offload job requests to the maximum extent
possible. On the contrary, ref. game-1 becomes infeasible in
high load conditions as some of the cloudlets start to violate
explicit latency constraints and ref. game-2 appears to overload
the under-loaded cloudlets by uncontrolled offloading of the
job requests. Next, Fig. 2b shows a comparison among average
utility values of all the participating cloudlets against job
request arrival rate with our game, ref. game-1, and ref. game-
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Fig. 4: Computation offload decision of cloudlets versus (parallel
update) iterations achieved using Algorithm 1. We consider three
cloudlets with µii = 1000 jobs/s and λ1 = 970 jobs/s, λ2 = 820 jobs/s,
and λ3 = 700 jobs/s.
2. It is clear that with our game, the average economic utility
values of the cloudlets are relatively better than both ref. game-
1 and ref. game-2 under all the network scenario.
Similarly, Fig. 3a shows a comparison of average end-to-end
latency performance and Fig. 3b shows a comparison among
average utility values of all the participating cloudlets against
job request arrival rate with our game, ref. game-1, and ref.
game-2. In this case, we consider a moderate variance in
job request arrival rates (within 0-200 jobs/s) among under-
loaded and overloaded cloudlets and the service rates of all the
cloudlets are µii = 1000 jobs/s. Note that both the plots show
similar behavior as in Fig. 2a and Fig. 2b. However, since the
difference between under-loaded and overloaded cloudlets in
job request arrival rates is lower than the previous case, the
scope for overloaded cloudlets to offload job requests is also
lower. Hence, the average end-to-end latency overshoots to a
relatively higher value in overload conditions and the average
utility gained are also lower.
In Fig. 4, we present the convergence rate of Algorithm 1
with three neighboring cloudlets (for not making the figure
unnecessarily overcrowded). We consider an average process-
ing rate µii = 1000 jobs/s for each cloudlet and their respective
incoming job requests are λ1 = 970 jobs/s, λ2 = 820 jobs/s,
and λ3 = 700 jobs/s. In this case, Cloudlet-1 is overloaded but
Cloudlet-2 and Cloudlet-3 are under-loaded. Hence, Cloudlet-
Fig. 5: Independently learning NE of the non-cooperative load balanc-
ing game with Algorithm 2 by two cloudlets with µ11 = µ22 = 1000
jobs/s, λ1 = 970 jobs/s, λ2 = 800 jobs/s, and Θ = 0.9, σ = 0.01.
Fig. 6: Average NE learning accuracy of Algorithm 2 over 1000 time-
slots of duration 10 ms against variation of learning rate parameter
Θ and spreading rate parameter σ.
1 offloads certain fraction of its total incoming job requests to
the under-loaded cloudlets, i.e., ϕ12 = 0.0219 and ϕ13 = 0.0569.
As Cloudlet-2 is the more loaded than Cloudlet-3, the compu-
tation offload fraction from Cloudlet-1 to Cloudlet-3 is more
than that of Cloudlet-2.
In Fig. 5, we observe the convergence properties of the
proposed reinforcement learning algorithm. We consider two
neighboring cloudlets, Cloudlet-1 and Cloudlet-2 with inter-
mediate transmission latency ti j = 1 msec, trying to meet a
QoS requirement of DQ = 10 msec. We also consider that
µ11 = µ22 = 1000 jobs/s and λ1 = 970 jobs/s, λ2 = 800 jobs/s,
such that Cloudlet-1 is overloaded, but Cloudlet-2 is under-
loaded. Therefore, to meet a QoS latency of DQ = 10 msec,
Cloudlet-1 needs to offload 0.098×λ1 job requests to Cloudlet-
2, whereas Cloudlet-2 does not need to offload anything (from
analytical solution). From the PDFs of both the cloudlets also,
we observe that the most preferable decision for Cloudlet-2 is
not to offload and Cloudlet-1 prefers to offload around 8-9%
of its total incoming job requests. As we choose the learning
and spreading parameters as Θ = 0.9 and σ = 0.01, respectively,
we see that Algorithm 2 converges to the expected utility and
reward values for both the cloudlets in nearly 1000 iterations.
Note that, instead of searching over the whole strategy space,
we considered only the most likely strategies that the cloudlets
should possibly consider by using our understanding from the
underlying load balancing game. Moreover, by using these
techniques, Algorithm 2 can perform 100% accurately when
all cloudlets are under-loaded without much exploration.
It is interesting to note that in the previously considered
scenario, even faster convergence to NE is possible by in-
creasing the value of the learning rate parameter Θ, but the
learning process may become unstable. Therefore, to study
the performance of Algorithm 2, we plot the average learning
accuracy within 1000 iterations in Fig. 6 against variation of
Θ and σ. As we consider 1000 iterations, i.e., 1000 time-
slots of duration 10 msec (same as DQ), hence it is expected
that received job request rates remain stationary at least for
10 seconds. From this plot, we observe that the NE learning
accuracy increases with Θ, but if we simultaneously increase
σ also, then accuracy performance starts to slightly decrease
as exploration increases.
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(a) Average NE learning accuracy with Θ = 0.9 and σ = 0.03.
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(b) Average NE learning accuracy with Θ = 4.0 and σ = 0.01.
Fig. 7: Average NE learning accuracy of Algorithm 2 for load
balancing game among three cloudlets with 30 second stationarity
time of job request arrival rates (λi) to all cloudlets.
Now, we consider a scenario where three competing
cloudlets are present with µ11 = µ22 = µ33 = 1000 jobs/s
and intermediate transmission latencies t12 = t21 = 0.5 msec,
t23 = t32 = 0.7 msec, and t31 = t13 = 0.9 msec. Moreover, the
job request arrival rates λi to each of these cloudlets randomly
change every 30 sec and hence, the utilities of each ith
cloudlet UNi changes accordingly. Firstly, Fig. 7a presents a
comparison between the learned utilities and actual utilities
(by solving P) with a small learning rate Θ = 0.9 and big
spreading rate σ = 0.03. Thus, we can observe that Algorithm
2 takes some time to learn the actual utility values after the
λi values change and some oscillation persists due to more
exploration. Secondly, Fig. 7b presents another comparison
between the learned utilities and actual utilities with a big
learning rate Θ = 4.0 and small spreading rate σ = 0.01. With
these parameters, we see that Algorithm 2 learns the actual
utility values relatively faster after λi values change, but there
is less oscillation afterwards.
From the previous results, we found that it is essential
to choose the learning rate and spreading rate parameters in
such a way so that a proper balance between exploration and
exploitation is maintained against the stationarity time of job
request arrival rates. Thus, in Fig. 8 we plot the average NE
learning accuracy against the stationarity period of the job
request arrival rate. We vary the stationarity time from 5 sec
to 150 sec and also tune Θ from 0.5 to 3 with σ = 0.01 in Fig.
8a, and tune σ from 0.009 to 0.030 with Θ = 0.9 in Fig. 8b.
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(a) Average NE learning accuracy with σ = 0.01.
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(b) Average NE learning accuracy with Θ = 0.9.
Fig. 8: Average NE learning accuracy of Algorithm 2 against sta-
tionarity time of job request arrival rates (λi) to all cloudlets with
variations of learning rate Θ and spreading rate σ.
We observe in general, that the performance of our proposed
Algorithm 2 increases as the stationarity of the job request
arrival rate increases because the algorithm is given more time-
slots to exploit and explore the search space.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed a novel economic and non-
cooperative game-theoretic model for low-latency applications
among multiple competitive cloudlets from same as well as
different service providers. We have designed a very efficient
method to solve the game and have proposed a very fast-
converging gradient projection algorithm to compute the pure-
strategy NE computation offload strategy among multiple
cloudlets. Moreover, we have proposed a centralized incen-
tive mechanism that computes the unique NE load balanc-
ing strategies of the cloudlets under the supervision of a
neutral mediator. This mechanism ensures that the truthful
revelation of private information to the mediator is a weakly-
dominant strategy for both the under-loaded and overloaded
cloudlets. We have also shown that our proposed game allows
the cloudlets to maximize their utilities better than some
recently proposed game-theoretic load balancing frameworks.
Followed by we have designed a distributed continuous-action
reinforcement learning automata-based algorithm to facilitate
the competing cloudlets to learn their NE job request of-
fload strategies independently, without exchanging any control
information with neighboring cloudlets. We have improved
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the convergence rate of the proposed reinforcement learning
algorithm by adapting the basic characteristics of the under-
lying game. Through extensive simulation, we have shown
the dependency of NE learning accuracy of our proposed
algorithm on learning rate and spreading rate parameters,
i.e., exploration and exploitation and derived various seminal
insights on the performance and adaptability of our proposed
reinforcement algorithm for non-cooperative load balancing
against dynamic job request arrival process in both overloaded
and under-loaded network conditions.
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APPENDIX A
LOAD BALANCING PROBLEM AMONG N ≥ 2 CLOUDLETS
Recall that the complete job request offloading strat-
egy space of all cloudlets is defined as a matrix Φ =
(ΦT1 ,Φ
T
2 , . . .,Φ
T
N )
T ⊂ RN×N , where ϕi = (ϕi1, ϕi2, . . ., ϕiN ) ∈
Φi ⊂ RN , ϕi j ∈ Φi j = [0,1] ⊂ R, and ∑Nj=1 ϕi j = 1,∀i ∈ C. Each
ϕi j denotes the fraction of job requests ith cloudlet offloads
to its j th neighboring cloudlet. Due to the non-homogeneous
service rates of the neighboring cloudlets, all the received
job requests at each ith cloudlet are served with different
service rates, e.g., ϕiiλi =
(
1−∑j 6=i ϕi j ) λi jobs/s are served
with service rate µii job/s and
∑
j 6=i ϕjiλj jobs/s are served
with service rate µji jobs/s. Therefore, to compute the overall
processing and queuing latency of the received job requests
at each cloudlet, we need to use a multi-dimensional Markov
chain for M/M/1 queues [1]. For this analysis, we make the
following assumptions:
• Each ith cloudlet is in state (mi1,mi2, . . .,miN ) at each
time-slot, where mi j denotes the independent job requests
received from j th cloudlet.
• The detailed balance equations for each ith cloudlet hold
for all the pairs of adjacent states (mi1, . . .,mi j, . . .,miN )
and (mi1, . . .,mi j + 1, . . .,miN ),
ϕjiλjPi(mi1, . . .,mi j, . . .,miN )
= µjiPi(mi1, . . .,mi j + 1, . . .,miN ),∀i, j ∈ C.
• The stationary state probability distribution of each ith
cloudlet can be expressed in the following product form,
Pi(mi1,mi2, . . .,miN ) = Pi1(mi1)Pi2(mi2) . . .PiN (miN ).
• The number of job requests received from j th neighbor-
ing cloudlet by each ith cloudlet follows the geometric
distribution, Pi(mi j) = ρ
mi j
ji (1− ρji), where ρji =
ϕ j iλ j
µ j i
.
With the above mentioned assumptions, we derive the
following closed form expression for average number of job
requests served by each ith cloudlet:
Mi =
∞∑
mi1=0
∞∑
mi2=0
. . .
∞∑
miN =0
{
(mi1 + · · ·+miN )
N∏
j=1
ρ
mi j
ji (1− ρji)
}
=
∑N
j=1
{
ρji
∏N
k=1,k 6=j(1− ρki)
}
∏N
j=1(1− ρji)
. (1)
Therefore, by using Little’s theorem [1] and (1), we get the
overall processing and queuing latency of the job requests at
ith cloudlet as follows:
Ti(ϕi,ϕ−i) =
1
ϕiiλi +
∑
j 6=i ϕjiλj
©­­«
∑N
j=1
{
ρji
∏N
k=1,k 6=j(1− ρki)
}
∏N
j=1(1− ρi j)
ª®®¬
=
1
ϕiiλi +
∑
j 6=i ϕjiλj
©­­«
∑N
j=1
{
ϕjiλj
∏N
k=1,k 6=j(µki −ϕkiλk)
}
∏N
j=1(µji −ϕi jλj)
ª®®¬ .
(2)
Now, we present a comparison of average end-to-end la-
tency performance in Fig. 1a and comparison among average
utility values of all the participating cloudlets in Fig. 1b with
our game, ref. game-1, and ref. game-2. In this case, we
keep the job request arrival rates of all the cloudlets equal
but vary their service rates. Thus, to calculate the processing
latency of each cloudlet, we need to use the expression in
(2) and this creates a very general load balancing scenario.
At first, we consider a high variance (1000-1500 jobs/s) of
service rates among neighboring cloudlets and observe similar
patterns of the graphs as before, but the end-to-end latency
and utility values are relatively better as the service rates of
some cloudlets are much higher than the average job request
arrival rate. We present similar graphs in Fig. 2a and in Fig.
2b, but we consider a moderate variance (1000-1200 jobs/s) of
service rates among neighboring cloudlets. As a consequence,
the latency and utility performance is slightly poorer than the
previous graphs as the under-loaded cloudlets have lesser room
to receive job requests from overloaded cloudlets.
APPENDIX B
A DETAILED PROOF OF LEMMA 4.1
Proof: Recall that in the game Γ, the utility function of
each ith cloudlet UNi (ϕi,ϕ−i),∀i ∈ C is defined as follows:
UNi (ϕi,ϕ−i) = Ω1
λi
µii
+ Ω2
N∑
j=1, j 6=i
γjiϕji
λj
µii
−Ω2
N∑
j=1, j 6=i
γi jϕi j
λi
µj j
−Ω3
[(
1−
N∑
j=1, j 6=i
ϕi j
)
λi
µii
max
{
0,
(
tui +
1
µii − (1−∑j 6=i ϕi j)λi −∑j 6=i ϕjiλj −DQ
)}
+
N∑
j=1, j 6=i
ϕji
λj
µii
max
{
0,
(
tuj +
1
µii − (1−∑j 6=i ϕi j)λi −∑j 6=i ϕjiλj + tji −DQ
)}]
.
(3)
From this definition, we can observe that when ith cloudlet
is able to meet the QoS target latency DQ, or (tuj +
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Fig. 1: Comparison of performance between our proposed game and
other games proposed in [2], [3] in terms of end-to-end latency and
utility values with high variance (1000-1500 jobs/s) in service rates
and same job request arrival rates among neighboring cloudlets.
1
µii−(1−∑ j 6=i ϕi j )λi−∑ j 6=i ϕ j iλ j + tji −DQ) ≤ 0, then the utility func-
tion can be interpreted as an affine function as follows:
UNi (ϕi,ϕ−i) = Ω1
λi
µii
+ Ω2
N∑
j=1, j 6=i
γjiϕji
λj
µii
−Ω2
N∑
j=1, j 6=i
γi jϕi j
λi
µj j
. (4)
Nonetheless, when ith cloudlet is unable to satisfy the QoS
target latency DQ, or (tui + 1µii−(1−∑ j 6=i ϕi j )λi−∑ j 6=i ϕ j iλ j −DQ) ≥
0, then the utility function should be interpreted as a non-linear
function as follows:
UNi (ϕi,ϕ−i) = Ω1
λi
µii
+ Ω2
N∑
j=1, j 6=i
γjiϕji
λj
µii
−Ω2
N∑
j=1, j 6=i
γi jϕi j
λi
µj j
−Ω3
[(
1−
N∑
j=1, j 6=i
ϕi j
)
λi
µii
{
tui +
1
µii − (1−∑j 6=i ϕi j)λi −∑j 6=i ϕjiλj −DQ
}
+
N∑
j=1, j 6=i
ϕji
λj
µii
{
tuj +
1
µii − (1−∑j 6=i ϕi j)λi −∑j 6=i ϕjiλj + tji −DQ
}]
. (5)
If (5) represents a concave function, then the sufficient
condition is that its Hessian matrix should be a positive
semi-definite matrix [4]. However, we find that both the
diagonal and non-diagonal elements of this matrix are equal,
as summarized below with i 6= j, k ∈ C:
∂2UNi
∂ϕ2i j
=
∂2UNi
∂ϕi j∂ϕik
=
−2Ω3λ2i
(µii − (1−∑j 6=i ϕi j)λi −∑j 6=i ϕjiλj)3 ≤ 0.
(6)
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(a) µii variance = 1000-1200 jobs/s and λi is same ∀i ∈ C.
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(b) µii variance = 1000-1200 jobs/s and λi is same ∀i ∈ C.
Fig. 2: Comparison of performance between our proposed game and
other games proposed in [2], [3] in terms of end-to-end latency and
utility values with moderate variance (1000-1200 jobs/s) in service
rates and same job request arrival rates among neighboring cloudlets.
Clearly, this implies that the Hessian of (4) is not a
semi-definite matrix and we need to extend our analysis by
evaluating the bordered Hessian matrix [5]. Note that the r th
order bordered Hessian matrix of UNi (ϕi,ϕ−i),∀i ∈ C, where
r = 1,2, . . .,N is written as follows:
HB =

0 ∂U
N
i
∂ϕi1
. . .
∂UNi
∂ϕir
∂UNi
∂ϕi1
∂2UNi
∂ϕ2
i1
. . .
∂2UNi
∂ϕi1∂ϕir
...
...
. . .
...
∂UNi
∂ϕir
∂2UNi
∂ϕir ∂ϕi1
. . .
∂2UNi
∂ϕ2ir

, (7)
whose the bordered elements are written as follows:
∂UNi
∂ϕi j
= −Ω2γi j λi
µj j
+ Ω3
λi
µii
[tui
+
µii
(µii − (1−∑j 6=i ϕi j)λi −∑j 6=i ϕjiλj)2 −DQ
]
. (8)
Now, we observe that the determinant values of the bordered
Hessian matrix (7), denoted by Dr , are negative when r is odd
3and are positive when r is even, ∀r = 1,2, . . .,N , as follows:
D1 = 0−
(
∂UNi
∂ϕi1
)2
= −
(
∂UNi
∂ϕi1
)2
≤ 0, (9)
D2 = 0−
(
∂UNi
∂ϕi1
) [(
∂UNi
∂ϕi1
) (
∂2UNi
∂ϕ2
i2
)
−
(
∂2UNi
∂ϕi1∂ϕi2
) (
∂UNi
∂ϕi2
)]
+
(
∂UNi
∂ϕi2
) [(
∂UNi
∂ϕi1
) (
∂2UNi
∂ϕi2∂ϕi1
)
−
(
∂2UNi
∂ϕ2
i1
) (
∂UNi
∂ϕi2
)]
= −
(
∂2UNi
∂ϕi1∂ϕi2
) [(
∂UNi
∂ϕi1
)
−
(
∂UNi
∂ϕi2
)]2
≥ 0, (10)
and so on. Note that, the inequalities in (9)-(10) hold true,
because
(
∂2UNi
∂ϕ2
i1
)
=
(
∂2UNi
∂ϕ2
i2
)
=
(
∂2UNi
∂ϕi1∂ϕi2
)
=
(
∂2UNi
∂ϕi2∂ϕi1
)
(from
(6)) and
[
µii −
(
1−∑j 6=i ϕi j ) λi −∑j 6=i ϕjiλj ] ≥ 0,∀i, j 6= i ∈ C.
Therefore, we can conclude that (5) is a quasi-concave func-
tion of ϕi [5], and in general, we can conclude that the utility
functions of each ith cloudlet UNi (ϕi,ϕ−i),∀i ∈ C are quasi-
concave functions of ϕi . Hence proved.
APPENDIX C
DETAILED CALCULATIONS TO FIND THE UNIQUE NE OF
THE NON-COOPERATIVE LOAD BALANCING GAME
In this section, we show all the calculations for finding
the NE of the non-cooperative load balancing game against
different network load conditions.
Case-1:
[(
tui + 1µii−λi
)
< DQ,
(
tuj + 1µ j j−λ j
)
< DQ
]
In this case, both the cloudlets are under-loaded and their
Lagrangian function can be written from Pu as follows:
Lui = Ω1
λi
µii
+ Ω2γjiϕji
λj
µii
−Ω2γi jϕi j λi
µj j
+αiϕi j + βi(1−ϕi j)
− ξi
(
tuj +
1
µii − (1−ϕi j)λi −ϕjiλj + tji −DQ
)
, (11)
where αi, βi, ξi ≥ 0 are Lagrange multipliers corresponding to
the respective constraints. Thus, the necessary first-order KKT
conditions (FOC) ∀i, j 6= i ∈ C are derived as follows:
∂Lui
∂ϕi j
= −Ω2γi j λi
µj j
+αi − βi + ξi
[
λi
(µii − (1−ϕi j)λi −ϕjiλj)2
]
= 0. (12)
In addition to this, the complementary slackness conditions
(CSC) ∀i, j 6= i ∈ C are written as follows:
αiϕi j = 0, (13)
βi(1−ϕi j) = 0, (14)
ξi
(
tuj +
1
µii − (1−ϕi j)λi −ϕjiλj + tji −DQ
)
= 0. (15)
Note that both the cloudlets have sufficient computational
resources to meet the QoS latency target and hence, (tuj +
1
µii−(1−ϕi j )λi−ϕ j iλ j + tji −DQ) < 0. Therefore, from (15) we get
ξ∗i = ξ
∗
j = 0. At first, we consider that 0 < ϕi j < 1, 0 < ϕi j <
1 and hence, αi = βi = αj = βj = 0 from (13)-(14). However,
with these values of Lagrange multipliers, we cannot solve the
equations from (12) and find any values for ϕi j and ϕji . Thus,
our initial considerations cannot lead to a valid NE solution.
Again, if we consider ϕi j = ϕji = 1, then αi = αj = 0
and βi > 0, βj > 0 from (13)-(14). With these values, solve
the equations from (12) and find that βi = −Ω2γi j λiµ j j , βj =
−Ω2γji λ jµii . Clearly, both of these values are negative and
hence, ϕi j = ϕji = 1 cannot be a valid NE solution.
Next, we consider ϕi j = 1, ϕji = 0 such that αi = 0, βi >
0 and αj > 0, βj = 0 from (13)-(14). With these values, we
solve the equations from (12) and find that βi = −Ω2γi j λiµ j j
and αj = Ω2γji
λ j
µii
. As βi is negative, hence ϕi j = 1, ϕji = 0
cannot be a valid NE solution. Similarly, if we consider ϕi j = 0,
ϕji = 1, then we obtain αi = Ω2γi j λiµ j j , βi = 0, αj = 0, and
βj = −Ω2γji λ jµii . This is also not a valid NE solution as βj
is a negative number.
Finally, we consider ϕi j = ϕji = 0 such that αi > 0, βi =
0 and αj > 0, βj = 0 from (13)-(14). Solving the equations
from (12) with these values, we find that αi = Ω2γi j λiµ j j and
αj = Ω2γji
λ j
µii
. Therefore, none of the Lagrange multipliers
are negative and the unique NE solution corresponding to this
case is ϕ∗i j = ϕ
∗
ji = 0. Intuitively, this implies that none of the
cloudlets offload any job requests to each other.
Case-2:
[(
tui + 1µii−λi
)
≥ DQ,
(
tuj + 1µ j j−λ j
)
≥ DQ
]
In this case, both the cloudlets are overloaded and hence,
the corresponding Lagrangian function from Po:
Loi = Ω1
λi
µii
+ Ω2γjiϕji
λj
µii
−Ω2γi jϕi j λi
µj j
−Ω3
[
(1−ϕi j) λi
µii
(
tui +
1
µii − (1−ϕi j)λi −ϕjiλj −DQ
)
+ϕji
λj
µii
(
tuj +
1
µii − (1−ϕi j)λi −ϕjiλj + tji −DQ
)]
+αiϕi j + βi(1−ϕi j)
+ ξi
(
tui +
1
µii − (1−ϕi j)λi −ϕjiλj −DQ
)
. (16)
Again, the necessary FOC and CSC ∀i, j 6= i ∈ C are derived
as follows:
∂Loi
∂ϕi j
= −Ω2γi j λi
µj j
+ Ω3
λi
µii
[
tui +
µii
(µii − (1−ϕi j)λi −ϕjiλj)2 −DQ
]
+αi − βi − ξi
[
λi
(µii − (1−ϕi j)λi −ϕjiλj)2
]
= 0, (17)
αiϕi j = 0, (18)
βi(1−ϕi j) = 0, (19)
ξi
(
tui +
1
µii − (1−ϕi j)λi −ϕjiλj −DQ
)
= 0. (20)
As both the cloudlets are overloaded, therefore, in this case,
(tui + 1µii−(1−ϕi j )λi−ϕ j iλ j −DQ) > 0 and (20) yields ξ∗i = ξ∗j = 0.
At first, we consider that 0 < ϕi j < 1, 0 < ϕi j < 1 and hence,
αi = βi = αj = βj = 0 from (18)-(19). With these values of
Lagrange multipliers, we find a system of non-linear equation
as follows:
−Ω2γi j λi
µj j
+ Ω3
λi
µii
[
tui +
µii
(µii − (1−ϕi j)λi −ϕjiλj)2 −DQ
]
= 0, (21)
−Ω2γji
λj
µii
+ Ω3
λj
µj j
[
tuj +
µj j
(µj j − (1−ϕji)λj −ϕi jλi)2 −DQ
]
= 0. (22)
4However, this is an inconsistent system of equations that
does not have any solution and hence, we cannot find any
valid NE solution. Again, if we consider ϕi j = ϕji = 1, then
αi =αj = 0 and βi > 0, βj > 0 from (13)-(14). With these values,
solve the equations from (12) and find that,
βi = −Ω2γi j λi
µj j
+ Ω3
λi
µii
[
tui +
µii
(µii −λj)2 −DQ
]
, (23)
βj = −Ω2γji
λj
µii
+ Ω3
λj
µj j
[
tuj +
µj j
(µj j −λi)2 −DQ
]
. (24)
We observe that both of these values are negative
based on the necessary game design condition Ω2 ≥
Ω3
[
max{tui}+ 1max{µii } + max{ti j} −DQ
]
,∀i, j 6= i ∈ C men-
tioned in Proposition 5.1. Therefore, ϕi j = ϕji = 1 cannot be a
valid NE solution.
Next, we consider ϕi j = 1, ϕji = 0 such that αi = 0, βi > 0
and αj > 0, βj = 0 from (13)-(14). With these values, we solve
the equations from (12) and find that,
βi = −Ω2γi j λi
µj j
+ Ω3
λi
µii
[
tui +
µii
(µii −λj)2 −DQ
]
, (25)
αj = Ω2γji
λj
µii
−Ω3
λj
µj j
[
tuj +
µj j
(µj j −λi)2 −DQ
]
. (26)
Although αj is positive, but βi is negative and hence, ϕi j = 1,
ϕji = 0 cannot be a valid NE solution. Similarly, if we consider
ϕi j = 0, ϕji = 1, then we obtain the following:
αi = Ω2γi j
λi
µj j
−Ω3 λi
µii
[
tui +
µii
(µii −λj)2 −DQ
]
, (27)
βj = −Ω2γji
λj
µii
+ Ω3
λj
µj j
[
tuj +
µj j
(µj j −λi)2 −DQ
]
. (28)
This implies that ϕi j = 0, ϕji = 1 is also not a valid NE
solution as βj is a negative number. Finally, we consider ϕi j =
ϕji = 0 such that αi > 0, βi = 0 and αj > 0, βj = 0 from (13)-
(14). Solving the equations from (12) with these values, we
find the following:
αi = Ω2γi j
λi
µj j
−Ω3 λi
µii
[
tui +
µii
(µii −λj)2 −DQ
]
, (29)
αj = Ω2γji
λj
µii
−Ω3
λj
µj j
[
tuj +
µj j
(µj j −λi)2 −DQ
]
. (30)
Clearly, both the Lagrange multipliers are positive and
hence, the unique NE solution corresponding to this case is
ϕ∗i j = ϕ
∗
ji = 0, which implies that both the cloudlets do not to
offload any job requests to each other.
Case-3:
[(
tui + 1µii−λi
)
≥ DQ,
(
tuj + 1µ j j−λ j
)
< DQ
]
In this case, we consider that ith cloudlet is overloaded
but j th cloudlet is under-loaded. Thus, ith cloudlet needs to
offload some job requests to j th cloudlet to meet the QoS
target latency DQ, as long as j th cloudlet does not exceed
DQ. This implies that 0 < ϕ∗i j < 1 and ϕ
∗
ji = 0. Moreover,
we get (tui + 1µii−(1−ϕi j )λi−ϕ j iλ j − DQ) = 0, ξ∗i > 0 and (tuj +
1
µii−(1−ϕi j )λi−ϕ j iλ j + tji −DQ) ≤ 0, ξ∗j = 0. Considering the FOC
(17) and CSC (18)-(20) for ith cloudlet and FOC (12) and
CSC (13)-(15) for j th cloudlet, we get the following unique
NE solution:
ϕ∗i j = 1−
1
λi
[
µii − 1DQ − tui
]
≤ 1
λi
[
µj j −λj − 1DQ − tui − ti j
]
. (31)
Along with this, we get the Lagrange multiplier values
α∗i = 0, β
∗
i = 0, α
∗
j = 0, and β
∗
j = 0. It is interesting to note
from (31) that for the overloaded ith cloudlet, the computation
offloading decision is not entirely controlled by itself. As long
as the under-loaded j th cloudlet can process the entire extra
load from ith cloudlet, ϕ∗i j = 1− 1λi
[
µii − 1DQ−tui
]
is acceptable.
However, when j th cloudlet cannot process the entire extra
load, then the offload fraction is not allowed to exceed
the upper-bound, and hence, ϕ∗i j =
1
λi
[
µj j −λj − 1DQ−tui−ti j
]
.
Therefore, from the above analysis we showed that we can
compute a unique NE for our proposed load balancing game
among competing cloudlets.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.3
Proof: We observe that the objective of the problem P
is non-negative with any feasible solution. If we can find a
vector ϕ∗ ∈ Φ as an NE point of the game Γ, then there exist
a set of non-negative values of the variables α∗i ∈ RN−1, β∗i ∈
RN−1, and ξ∗i ∈ RN−1 such that all the necessary FOC and
CSC conditions of Γ are satisfied. Clearly, with these values
of the variables, the objective function of P becomes 0 and
hence, the non-negative optimal value is reached. On the other
hand, due to the concavity of the constraint functions, the KKT
conditions are sufficient for ϕ∗i to be the maxima of utilities
of each cloudlet UNi (ϕi,ϕ−i).
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5.1
Proof: From the NE solution of the proposed non-
cooperative load balancing game, we know that any overloaded
cloudlet offloads only a small fraction of its total job request
arrival rate, i.e., ϕ∗i j ≈ 0, ϕ∗i jλi  λi . Now, for the proposed
incentive mechanism to work perfectly, we need to find a
common relation among the primary networks parameters such
that (UˆNi −UNi ) ≤ 0 holds for all the expressions (22)-(25)
in the main manuscript. By inspection, we can conclude that
Ω2 ≥ Ω3
[
max{tui}+ 1max{µii } + max{ti j} −DQ
]
,∀i, j 6= i ∈ C is
one such relation and hence, it is a necessary condition for the
successful implementation of the incentive mechanism.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF THEOREM 6.1
Proof: We considered that the strategy space Φi is a
compact set in the load balancing game Γ and the stochastic
reward values are normalized, i.e., Ri : R→ [0,1],∀i ∈ C. The
authors of [6] showed that with such conditions, a continuous
action reinforcement learning automata-based PDF update
rule,
f (n+1)i (ϕi) = χ
(n)
[
f (n)i (ϕi)
+Θ(n)
(
R(n)i −R(n−1)i
)
exp
−
1
2
(
ϕi −ϕ(n)i
σ(n)
)2
 , (32)
5can be guaranteed to converge to a local optimal NE, if the
following necessary restrictions are imposed:
(i) We choose a sufficiently small value of Θ such that each
ith cloudlet can match their expected strategy through
iterations.
(ii) We choose a value of σ such that the equilibrium point
of fi(ϕi) has an upper bound 1
σ
√
2pi
.
Thus, if the above restrictions are satisfied, then the contin-
uous action reinforcement learning automata-based algorithm
will converge to at least one of the existing NE of the
underlying continuous-kernel game. However, we computed
a unique pure-strategy NE under both overloaded and under-
loaded network conditions in Section IV. Therefore, our pro-
posed algorithm with update rule (32) will always converge
to the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of the underlying non-
cooperative load balancing game.
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